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For age and want save while you may
No morning Sun lasts a whole day.
Tralee Savings Bank pass-book, 1820s
2 
1. BEGINNINGS:
The outline history of provident institutions or savings banks is well known.  Part
of an early nineteenth-century middle-class campaign to make save more and therefore
less reliant on public and private charity, they aimed to provide account-holders with
security, liquidity, and a generous return on deposits.  They originated in lowland Scotland
in the early 1810s, whence they quickly spread throughout the United Kingdom and as far
as the United States.  Their success prompted legislative approval.  In the United
Kingdom official subvention was also forthcoming.
3  
The new institution was first successfully transplanted to Ireland in January 1816,
with the opening of the Belfast Savings Bank.  Banks were soon being set up throughout
the island.  Diffusion was fastest in 1818 and 1819, and by the mid-1820s the Irish
network had been essentially established.  Of the 74 banks still open in late 1846 46 had
been created in 1816-25, a further 21 in 1826-35, and only seven from 1836 on.  Long-
established banks best withstood the pressures of the late 1840s, described below.  Of the
46 founded before 1826 six had gone by 1848.  Of the next 21, eight had failed by 1848;
of the last seven, five had folded three years later.  The earlier savings banks were also
bigger.  By late 1829 there were 73 savings banks in Ireland.  On the eve of the famine
there were nearly one hundred thousand depositors holding balances totalling almost £3
million  in 76 banks.
4
This new institutional import never bulked as large in Ireland as it did in Britain. 
On the eve of the famine Ireland’s population was more than half that of England &
Wales, and more than double that of Scotland.  Yet Ireland had only half as many savings
banks as Scotland, and about one-sixth as many as England and Wales.  Alternatively,
England and Wales had 60 savings bank accounts per thousand people, and about £1.7
deposited per inhabitant; while in Ireland these numbers were eleven bank accounts and-2-
£0.3 deposited.  The main reason for such differences was the Irish economy’s relative
backwardness and and overwhelmingly rural character.  In Ireland as in the rest of the UK
account-holders were disproportionately urban.   Just before the famine of 1846-50
Ireland’s four biggest cities (Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Belfast) held only one-twentieth of
the population but two-fifths of all savings bank accounts.  In those cities the ratio of
accounts to people was about one to ten.
The number of depositors was also strongly correlated with the size of the town in
which a bank was located.   Since a bank’s catchment area was largely determined by
walking distance, with the great majority of customers living with ten or twelve miles of
their bank, small- town and village banks were at a distinct disadvantage.
5   Thus the
biggest savings banks were those in Dublin (16,640 depositors in three branches of the
main savings bank on 20 November 1846 and several thousand more in a troubled bank
on Cuffe Street), Cork (12,510), Belfast (6,387), Limerick (5,454), Waterford (4,048), and
Newry (3,096).   The smallest were in Killough, Co. Down (25 accounts, population
1,148), Tyrellspass, Co. Westmeath (104 accounts, population 623), Cootehill, Co. Cavan
(107 accounts, population 2,425), and Castleknock, Co. Dublin (139 accounts, population
156).   The correlation between town size and aggregate deposits was very high (over
+0.9):  the average sum deposited in banks in towns of less than two thousand inhabitants
in 1846 was £10,772, compared to £14,660 in towns of 2,000-4,999 inhabitants, £28,105
in towns of 5,000-9,999 inhabitants, £46,520 in towns of 10,000-19,999 inhabitants, and
£265,160 in towns and cities of over 20,000.  Official data on the costs and transactions
of individual banks in 1848-50 suggest not only that unit cost declined with size but that




     TABLE 1: BANKING COSTS IN IRELAND, ENGLAND & WALES,
AND SCOTLAND IN 1848:
Ireland   E&W    Scotland
[1] Number      61     481        40
[2] Annual Cost (£)  9,148.8 88,421.8    4,913.8
[3] Accounts   50,119 909,336     85,472
[4] Deposits (£1,000)  1,358.1 25,371.2    1,080.2
[5]   [2]/[3]    0.18      0.10     0.06
[6]   [2]/[4]    6.74      3.49     4.55
Source: Thoms Almanac 1850, p. 195. 
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The diffusion of savings banks relied on local grandees to lend prestige, and on
philanthropic professionals, businessmen, and the clergy to provide the initiative and to
act as trustees or managers.  In Ireland success also entailed a management team that was
ecumenical in composition.  Some of the smaller, less successful Irish banks were largely
landlord creations.
7  The landlord connection is reflected in their small-town locations and
in their dual-function premises doubling up as rent offices.  In Scotland a savings bank
office occasionally shared office space with a commercial bank, but never with a rent
office.
8
The rest of this paper may be outlined as follows.  Part 2 applies Irish evidence to a
central issue in the historiography of savings banks, viz. whether they achieved the main
aim of their founders of getting the poor to save.  Part 3 throws some more light on the
history of Irish savings bank through an analysis of the surviving records of one savings
bank.  Part 4 addresses the question of Irish savings banks’ vulnerability, focusing in
particular on the issue of panics and resulting contagion.  Part 5 concludes. 
2. TARGETTING THE POOR?
 The early supporters of savings banks everywhere, both inside and outside the
legislature, identified with the industrious poor.
9  In England and Wales, by and large, the-4-
history of the banks did not conform to the pioneers’ hopes.  From the outset critics of
state support  denounced the uneconomically high rate of interest paid on deposits and
the difficulty of preventing the wealthy from free riding on a system intended for the
poor.  These criticisms soon reached the floor of the House of Commons.  One M.P.,
noting how his own savings bank excluded the better off, found it ‘astonishing how many
persons of a superior rank endeavour to avail themselves of it’.  Another also worried
about savers ‘for whom such banks were not originally intended’ benefitting, adding that
the poor had ‘rather an aversion’ to high interest rates.  By 1822 the initial enthusiasm of a
third M.P., economist David Ricardo, had cooled considerably, prompting him to argue
for a system that locked in savings until old age.  But the gap between the reality of short-
lived accounts that were quite sensitive to the rate of interest and Ricardo’s plan was a
wide one.  Defenders of generous interest payments countered that the ‘improved
morality of the lower orders’ would more than compensate for any abuse.
10 
In due course legislation took such criticisms on board by reducing the rate of
interest payable and the maximum permissable deposit per account. In the 1810s deposits
earned more than 4 per cent; by the mid-1840s most banks were paying between 2.75 and
3 per cent.  Given near zero inflation and the lack of alternative outlets for small savings,
this was still an attractive rate of return.  Yet in 1850 expert witnesses before a select
committee on saving declared that savings banks were still little used by working men.
11
Anxious to place the banks in a favourable light, their historian Oliver Horne
asserted that ‘a few cases of deposit by persons for whom the savings bank... was not
intended, can easily be magnified out of all proportion’, and claimed that ‘from a quarter
to a half, in the early days, were domestic servants, the remainder mainly artisans, small
tradesmen, women, and children’.  Horne admitted that labourers were few, but rich
depositors were few also, and ‘the statutory limits of deposit prevented any serious
abuse’.
12  Horne’s account is marred by its apologetic stance even on issues of purely
historical interest.  More iconoclastic historians such as John Clapham and Neil Smelser
13
revived the old criticism that, on the contrary, the movement bypassed the really poor,
and that its main beneficiaries were better-off savers, attracted by the generous interest
rate paid.  Their argument is corroborated by economic historian Albert Fishlow, who
found for England and Wales that the subsidisation of the banks in their early years ‘was
not totally, or even significantly, directed to the classes for which it was intended’.
14-5-
In Scotland the savings banks came closer to fulfilling their founders’ mission.  An
important reason for the difference is that a more advanced joint-stock banking system
meant greater competition for the savings of the better off.  In Ireland joint-stock banks
were more likely to cede some savings to the new institutions than compete with them on
interest rates.  Thus one of the managers of the Coleraine Savings Bank boasted in 1834
that savings had been ‘gradually withdrawn from the branch of the Provincial Bank.... and
lodged with us’.  While in Scotland commercial banks paid good interest on deposits
accounts, most Irish banks paid very low rates, and the dominant Bank of Ireland paid
none until forced by competition to relent in 1865.
15 
Hard evidence on the economic status of Irish savers is scarce for the early years,
but it is significant that the very first annual report of the Cork Savings Bank (founded in
1817) noted that many of its depositors were too prosperous to deserve its benefits, and
that ‘this species of deposits, if continued, would eventually close the Bank, as no
gentleman could be got to give their time gratuitously as Managers to conduct the money
dealings of their equals and in many cases their superiors in rank and property’. 
Qualitative evidence in the 1835-6 Irish Poor Inquiry corroborates, suggesting that
farmers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen were much more likely to be account-holders than
labourers, though servants also feature prominently in the categories listed.  In 1849 the
local gentry stopped funding the small bank in Carrickmacross, because depositors were
‘principally of a class superior to those for whose benefit the institution was originally
intended’.
16
Scattered aggregate data offer some clues on savers’ socio-economic status. First,
in mid-century the average sum deposited per account holder in Ireland the average  was
£28, slightly more than those in England (£26) and Wales (£27), and double that in
Scotland (£14).  Given that income per head in Ireland  at the time was probably half or
less that of the rest of the United Kingdom, these numbers suggest that Irish depositors
came from further up the income distribution.
17 
  Second, the breakdowns by occupation in Table 2 are of particular interest.  Had
the savings banks been mainly about ‘encouraging and rewarding the industry and self-
denial of the working classes’
18, savers in categories 7 (labourers, servants, journeymen), 8
(domestic servants, nurses, etc.), and 9 (dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans) should
have dominated.  In England and Wales these three combined accounted for 41 per cent-6-
of deposits and 37 per cent of accounts.  In Scotland they accounted for 37 and 38 per
cent.  In Ireland, however, they accounted for only 16.5 and 23 per cent, respectively. 
Variations in the structure of the labour force could not account for the difference:  it is
clear that the unskilled and the lowly skilled formed a much smaller proportion of savers
in Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom.  Tradesmen (a category which includes
farmers) and women without a reported occupation were proportionately more important
in Ireland.  Since Irish labourers and servants were much poorer than their English or
Welsh peers, it is perhaps reassuring to find that those of them who saved, saved less. 
However, the high averages in Irish trust accounts and in the accounts of minors are
suspicious, as are those of gentlemen and professionals.  The high average sums deposited
would suggest that in both Ireland and England  money which would otherwise have been
deposited in joint-stock or country banks was diverted into the savings banks.  For
reasons noted above, Scotland was different: its savings banks were best at targetting
those for whom they were intended, and the average deposits there were lowest  in all
occupational categories.
 A third comparison is offered by the average sizes of deposits and withdrawals.  If
the clients of savings banks were mainly men and women of modest means who saved
incremently, then one might expect the average withdrawal to exceed the average deposit. 
The situation in the UK in mid-century is described below in Table 3.  Nowhere were
accounts very active; everywhere the number of deposits per account exceeded the
number of withdrawals.  In both England and Wales and in Scotland the average
withdrawal was much bigger than the average deposit, but this was not so in Ireland. 
Note too that the average deposit was highest in Ireland by a comfortable margin. 
Another difference between Ireland and Britain is that whereas the average deposit fell in
the 1830s and 1840s in the latter, and aggreagate savings grew slowly, in the formerthe
average deposit rose and the aggregate sum deposited grew quite fast   –  at a rate of
nearly 6 per cent per annum.  This difference is probably attributable to greater
attractiveness of joint-stock banks in Britain after legislation reduced the interest rate that
savings banks could pay in 1828.
19
  The size-distributions of accounts in individual Irish savings banks also suggest
that many of them did not cater primarily for the very poor.  The distinction between
deposits and depositors is apposite here.
20  The 43,281 Irish account holders with deposits-7-
of £20 or less in 1845 accounted for over two-fifths of savers but for only one-ninth or so
of all savings.  Nearly-two thirds of the savings were held in the 47,318 accounts worth
between £20 and £100.  Note that on the eve of the famine Irish GDP per capita was
£10-£12, while a farm labourer’s annual wage averaged £10 or less. 
In the cities of Dublin and Belfast, it is true, the preponderance of small accounts
suggests that those on modest incomes were better represented.  On the eve of the famine
a clear majority of accounts (62 per cent in Dublin, 55 per cent in Belfast) contained £20
or less.  However, in Cork and Limerick savings banks the proportions holding £20 or
less were much lower  –  39 and 36 per cent.  In the towns of Castlebar and Boyle, located
in the impoverished west,  the proportions were 33 and 36 per cent.
21  
In sum, it is quite clear that if in England savings banks did little for the groups most
directly affected by the Industrial Revolution
22, in Ireland their impact on the labouring,
mainly rural, poor was even less. -8-
____________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2: OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS, 1852
A.  PERCENTAGE OF DEPOSITS (£) IN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP:
  England  Wales           Scotland       Ireland
    1. Gentlemen      1.2        2.1       1.0   3.6
    2. Professional men      0.6    0.9   1.4   1.1
    3. Working in education (M+F)      1.2    0.2   0.1   1.5
    4. Tradesmen, etc. (*)    26.0   37.8 29.0 43.7
    5. Soldiers, mariners      2.2    2.2   0.6     3.8
    6.  Policemen, etc.      0.3    0.0   0.1   0.9
    7. Labourers, servants, journeymen    15.0         13.8 16.6    4.8
    8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)    24.0  17.9 20.3 11.0 
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans      2.1        0.1    0.4   0.7
  10. Married women, spinsters, widows    13.2  14.5      13.6   19.1 
  11. Minors      8.2    5.6        6.6        8.3 
  12. Trust accounts      1.5          1.9    0.1   1.0 
  13. Misc.      4.6           3.1     10.4   0.6 
      Total (£)           26,317,614   583,748           1,577,035           1,429,840
B. PERCENTAGE OF ACCOUNTS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP:
England Wales Scotland Ireland
    1. Gentlemen     1.1   2.5    1.2    3.0
    2. Professional men     0.5   1.0    0.8    0.8
    3. Working in education     1.0   0.0    0.1    1.5
    4. Tradesmen, etc.(*)   23.9 31.7  25.9  40.0
    5. Soldiers, mariners, etc.     1.6   2.2    0.5    2.9
    6. Policemen, etc.     0.2   0.0    0.1    0.6
    7. Labourers   12.6  15.2  16.3    7.2
    8.  Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)   22.1  20.1  21.3  14.8
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans     2.4    0.1    0.4    1.1
  10. Married women, spinsters, widows   11.1  13.7  13.4  18.2
  11. Minors   16.3    9.9  11.6    8.3
  12. Trust accounts     2.1    1.3    0.1    1.0
  13. Misc.     5.0    2.2    8.4    0.6
Total 1,004,143 21,815 110,341 51,848-9-
TABLE 2, contimued
C. AVERAGE (£) BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
England Wales Scotland Ireland
    1. Gentlemen    28   22    12    33
    2. Professional men    29   24    24    38
    3. Working in education    32   43    15    27
    4. Tradesmen, etc.(*)    28   32    16    30
    5. Soldiers, mariners, etc.    35   27    17    36
    6. Policemen, etc.    34   33    13    39
    7. Labourers    31   24    15    18
    8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)    30   24    14    20
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans    24   24    15    17
  10. Married women, widows, spinsters    32   28    15    29
  11. Minors    13   15      8    27
  12. Trust accounts    18   18    11    28
  13. Misc.    33   24    18    27
     Total (£)      26   27    14    28
(*) Tradesmen and their assistants, small farmers, clerks, mechanics, artisans not described as
journeymen, and their wives
Source: derived from BPP 1852 (.521) XXVIII, 757, ‘Return from each savings bank in the United
Kingdom of the house or building in which business is transacted....’
_______________________________________________________________________________________






  £     s    d
Average withdrawal
    £      s    d
England and
Wales
1.1 0.5   5   17    2    14    2    7½
Scotland 1.8 1.0   3   18    0      5    9    4
Ireland 1.5 1.0   8   15   10½      8    6    8½
Source:  BPP 1852 (.213) XXVIII, 597, ‘Return of savings bank in the United Kingdom
showing their number of offices, their salaries and allowances..’’
 
3. THE THURLES SAVINGS BANK:
On the eve of the famine the population of Tipperary, Ireland’s largest inland
county, was not far off half a million, or over three times its present level.  The county is
almost bisected by the river Suir, on which three of its main towns  –  Carrick-on-Suir,-10-
Clonmel,  and Thurles  –  were located.  The trade of Carrick, closest to the sea, was well
served by the river, but the navigation upriver from Carrick to Clonmel was less
satisfactory, and the trade of Thurles, another twenty miles on, was confined to overland
carriage.  The location of location some miles off both the main Dublin-Cork and Dublin-
Limerick roads also left pre-famine a little isolated, which probably explains why it was
usually missed by the numerous writers who described their travels around pre-famine
Ireland.  Smaller than Clonmel and Carrick, it contained nearly eight thousand people on
the eve of the Great Famine.  Between 1829 and 1871 it was the location of the Thurles
Savings Bank (henceforth the TSB). 
Thurles was the commercial centre for a hinterland dominated by mixed farming
and the town’s industrial base  –  a substantial brewery and a tannery  –  depended on
agricultural raw materials.  Just before the Great Famine its commercial banking needs
were met by branches of the National Bank and the Tipperary Bank.  Pre-famine Thurles
was deemed important enough for a branch bank by either the Bank of Ireland or the
Provincial Bank, but the National Bank set up shop there in its first year (1835) and was
followed by the short-lived Agricultural and Commercial Bank in 1836 and the Tipperary
Bank in 1840.  In effect the Tipperary Bank represented the Bank of Ireland both in the
town and in the county generally, having foregone its note-issuing rights in return for
special discounting facilities at branches of the Bank of Ireland.  Thurles was also the
cathedral town of the Catholic diocese of Cashel and Emly.  Its original ‘big chapel’, built
at a cost of £10,000 in the 1800s, had standing-room accommodation for seven to eight
thousand persons.
In 1837 Lewis’s Topographical Dictionary deemed most of the town’s twelve hundred
houses ‘neatly built’ and several ‘of handsome appearance’, but John Henry Newman,
who described the town after a visit in 1851 as ‘squalid’, scuppered plans to seat the
proposed Catholic University there.
23  Indeed both housing and literacy data in the
population census of 1841 suggest that Thurles was a relatively poor town.  Nearly half its
families lived in one-room cabins or one-room tenement accommodation.  In the
surrounding and neighbouring parishes housing conditions were better and literacy rates
higher.
Nevertheless the town’s population growth in the pre-famine period was
significant (6,040 in 1821, 7,523 in 1841).  By the same token the impact of the Great-11-
Famine on Thurles and its hinterland was severe.
24  The town’s population continued to
decline in the 1850s, and then stagnated at around five thousand between 1861 and 1881. 
But for its status as cathedral town Thurles would have fallen further behind in the post-
famine era;  the construction of its grandiose new cathedral, which began in 1861 and was
not completed until 1879, provided a modicum of employment.
The decision to create the bank was taken at a meeting of ‘those Gentlemen who
are disposed to lend their Aid...for the Benefit of the Town and Neighbourhood ’,
convened on 8 October 1829 by the protestant archdeacon of Thurles, Henry Cotton, and
chaired by Daniel M. Ryan, a local Catholic landlord.  The bank opened for business two
months later.  Its trustees and managers were mainly local clergymen, landed proprietors,
and professional people.
25  The bank was fortunate in its personnel, both unpaid and paid. 
There was enough of a ‘leisure class’ in Thurles and its hinterland to sustain it.  The local
Protestant clergy were particularly active in its affairs, with Archdeacon Cotton involved
from beginning to end.  In the early years James Butler M.D. and Rev. Dr. Thomas
O’Connor, first president of a local seminary established in 1837, also played prominent
roles.  When Thomas Kirwan resigned as treasurer in November 1833 he was thanked by
fellow managers ‘for zealous and efficient discharge of the duties of his office for four
years to which is mainly to be attributed the progressive improvement of the Bank’  Most
of its officers were long-serving.  Between 1829 and 1859 the bank had only three
treasurers (after which the National Bank fulfilled the function), and local shopkeeper,
stamp-seller, and stationer Matthew Quinlan served as part-time actuary from beginning
to end, on a salary that varied with the volume of business.  However, only a minority of
the twenty trustees nominated at the outset played any significant part in TSB’s
operations, and some seem never to have attended a quarterly trustees’ meeting.  In effect
at any one time the bank was run by a group of six to eight people, and attendance at the
trustees’ quarterly meetings rarely exceeded five or six.
The savings banks’ annual returns reproduced in Thoms Almanac suggest that it was
broadly representative of banks located outside the bigger cities.  In November 1846 it
had £31,815 deposited in 892 accounts.  The average sum on deposit, £35 13s 4d, was on
the high side, exceeded by only seven of a total of 76 banks (the average for the country as
a whole being £30 8s).  Thurles’s average was inflated by the particularly high percentage
of savers in the £20-£50 bracket: 52 per cent of the total against 38 per cent nationally.
26    -12-
Uniquely for Ireland, it seems, the records of the TSB survive almost in their
entirety and have already been the subject of a very fine study by James O’Shea.
27  Table 4
chronicles the earliest transactions in the bank.  Rather inauspiciously, on its first day (14
December 1829) the bank attracted no custom but trustees Thomas Kirwan and James
Butler opened accounts in their own names, while Kirwan and William Ryan, another
trustee, each opened trust accounts for one of their children.  All these accounts began
with token deposits of £1 each.  A week later Rev. Henry Armstrong, another trustee,
opened two more trust accounts.  Bridget Shea was the first real customer, and she
accompanied her deposit of £30 with three more of the same amount for other family
members.  A week later one Michael Mullally of Thurles deposited £7.  Bridget Shea
returned with another £30 on 4 January 1830, this time in the name of a nine-year old
niece, while William Ryan opened another trust account for his two year-old son Thomas. 
Thereafter deposits by founding trustees became rarer and those of the likes of Bridget
Ryan more typical.
Throughout its lifetime the bank opened only once a week, on Mondays between 1
and 2 p.m.  (The choice of Mondays is puzzling;  fairs were held on the first Tuesday of
the month).  Over its lifetime the bank received £187,057 10s 6d in deposits.  In all 4,213
individual accounts were opened, as well as another 51 representing voluntary
organisations or charitable institutions.  More than half of the total were opened before
the end of 1845.
In the 1829-1846 period deposits exceeded withdrawals in each year with the
exception of 1840 and 1842.  However, in 1834-36 there were substantial withdrawals
(£11,265 against £14,340 deposited).  Both openings and closings were subject to
clustering.  There were clusters of applications in November 1831-May 1832, in
November 1832-March 1833, and in February-June 1835.  During 1839 and 1840 339
new accounts were opened.  New account holders were also numerous between
November 1846 and April 1847 (181 in all).  Clusters of account closures, probably for
the most part prompted by exogenous events, were bigger.  In March 1835 23 accounts
closed, a monthly total equalled in April 1840 and February 1845, but not exceeded until
April 1847, when 54 accounts closed.  The 1835 closures may have been prompted by
establishment of the National Bank’s Thurles branch and those of April 1840 by the-13-
opening of the Tipperary Bank’s branch.  If the 105 closures in January 1871 are excluded,
the highest number of closures in a single month was 91 in April 1848, followed by 71 in
June 1848.  The context of the 1848 closures is discussed below.  In March 1856 the
sensational collapse of the Tipperary Bank prompted the closure of another sixty or so
accounts.  The international financial crisis of November 1857 caused another 25 or so to
close.
The 1850s and 1860s were challenging decades for the TSB.  Its managers
increased the interest payable on accounts from 2.5 per cent to 2.87 per cent in November
1863 in an effort to stem the tide of account closures, but without effect.  In January 1865
forty savers closed their accounts, and between October 1865 and February 1866 another
one hundred accounts were closed.  These could have been associated with a change in
interest rate policy on the part of the other banks, or the establishment in Thurles of
branches of the Munster Bank in 1865 and the Bank of Ireland in 1867, after the collapse
of the Tipperary Bank.  The newly-founded Munster Bank was aggressive in its pursuit of
new customers, and the Bank of Ireland’s decision to open was almost certainly prompted
in part by the Munster’s action.
28  The relatively high average sum remaining in TSB
accounts closed in these months (£48.8, compared to an average of £31.8 in the 185
accounts closed in January 1864-September 1865) suggests customers who switched to
regular bank accounts.  The outflow of accounts to the joint-stock banks in 1835, 1840,
and 1865-7 bespeaks clients who were very responsive to alternative saving outlets. 
Sometimes clusters in openings and closings seemed to coincide, or almost so (as in the
mid-1830s and in 1847-8).  When the final decision to close the bank was taken at the end
of 1870 only two hundred accounts remained.  The average duration of these accounts
was nearly nine years.
The winding-up of the TSB was being discussed from 1866 on.  On 10 December
1870 a special meeting of managers and trustees, which attracted an attendance of only
seven, resolved ‘in consequence of the government having opened P.O. Savings Banks’ to
accept no deposits after 20 January and to close the TSB on 20 February 1871.  But clearly
the creation of the post office savings bank was only part of the story.  The small number
of deposits remaining after the closing date were transferred to the local post office
savings bank.  The last meeting of trustees on 29 April 1871 was attended by only a very
elderly Archdeacon Cotton, who had initiated the whole project, and the Rev. Christopher-14-
B. Harley, another Church of Ireland clergyman.  At that meeting they decided to grant
the treasurer £20 due to him, and the actuary and the auditor £40 and £10 each by way of
compensation for the loss of their jobs.  The bank’s six ledgers, two minute books, and
other records were then deposited in an iron safe in the Thurles National Bank.
29
Before generalizing about savers and saving patterns in the TSB, here are some
details from a cross-section of individual accounts:  
[1] There were five accounts, beginning at different dates with some
overlap, in the name of Matthew Quinlan.  These were presumably accounts held
by the bank’s long-serving actuary, Matthew Quinlan and a namesake son. 
Quinlan also opened accounts for daughters Mary (aged 2 years), Ann (7), and
Bridget (8) in November 1830.  Bridget’s account was not closed until December
1870, eight years after the other two.  All three began with deposits of a few
shillings and contained £64, £43, and £92, respectively, at the end.  They were
characterized by an average of one or two deposits annually, and a smaller number
of larger withdrawals.  Quinlan’s wife also held an account between 1847 and 1862,
during which time she made seventeen lodgements and thirteen withdrawals.  By
beginning with such small balances, Quinlan was probably seeking to inculcate the
saving habit into his daughters at an early age.  
[2] George Pinchin of Borrisoleigh opened an account with £4 in January
1838.  Four months later his wife and daughter placed £30 each in new accounts,
and in November 1847 two sons opened accounts with £32 and £30, respectively. 
Pinchin’s own account was the most active; the others were held for only short
periods. 
[3] Thomas Barry, a seventy year old farmer from Seskin, Upperchurch,
opened an account with a deposit of £31 (£1 over the legislated limit) in May 1838. 
So did his wife Catherine, sons Thomas and Edmund, and daughters Eleanor and
Catherine.  Another daughter, Grace, also opened an account with £31 six months
later.  All the childrens’ accounts were held in trust in their father’s name.  In all
cases the opening lodgement was the only one, and there were only three-15-
withdrawals.  All seven accounts had been closed by April 1843.
[4] Francis O’Brien Esq. of Thurles and members of his family held eight
different accounts at different times, all of which started off with a deposit of £30. 
Four were opened together in March 1852, but closed at different dates.
[5] Ellen Sullivan, a servant at the Priory, Templemore, was thirty years old
when she opened an account with £22 in May 1831, which she closed by
withdrawing the remaining £5 in April 1849.  In the interim she had lodged a total
of £110 in seven other deposits and made fourteen withdrawals.  Her account
peaked at £73.
[6] Edmund Shepherd, a forty-five year old tailor from Coogulla,
Loughmore, opened his account with a lodgement of £10 in March 1837.  In the
following eleven years he made ten more lodgements totalling £98, and six
withdrawals totalling £78.   He withdrew his remaining £30 during a run on the
bank in May 1848 (on which more below).  His wife Catherine opened an account
in April 1847, also lodging £10.  She made a further lodgement of £11 and one
withdrawal of £10 before also closing her account in May 1848. 
[7] Michael Slattery, the local Catholic archbishop
30, opened an account
with £30 in July 1843, and closed it in January 1846 without making any further
transactions in the interim.  His predecessor, Edward McKenna, started off with
£14 in April 1839, which had risen to £54 in five lodgements when he closed his
account a year later.
[8] John Bray, a wealthy Thurles merchant and brewer, opened an account
with £9 in December 1841 and withdrew the £99 he had lodged in seven
installments in July 1848.  His wife Ellen held two accounts, in October 1843-
November 1853 and in July 1856-December 1864.  Their daughter Catherine held
two very active accounts simultaneously (April 1840-August 1870 and May 1840-
November 1870).  Catherine made 102 lodgements totalling £934 in the first, and-16-
84 lodgements totalling £878 in the second, thus averaging six lodgements a year. 
Though holding two accounts was in breach of savings banks regulations, she kept
the maximum sums held in either at any one time (£193 and  £173) below the legal
limit of £200.  Three sisters, Anna (September 1842-February 1860), Johanna (May
1840-June 1848), and Mary (May 1840-February 1860), also held accounts, all
involving relatively frequent lodgements and large sums on deposit. 
[9] James B. Kennedy Esq. of Thurles opened four different accounts in his
own name in May 1844.  His status and the opening balances  – ranging from £10
to £20  – suggest that he may have been acting on behalf of poorer savers.  One of
these accounts was closed in the following year, the other three in 1848.
Several features of the accounts are noteworthy.  Male account holders
outnumbered female, though not strikingly so (2,387 to 1,826).  The average opening
balance in male accounts exceeded that in female by £19.7 to £17.4:  a slender margin,
given the big gender gap in earnings in nineteenth-century Ireland.  Another interesting
feature is that openings were subject to marked seasonality (Figure 1(a) ), peaking in
March (when 13.3 per cent of all accounts were opened) and troughing in September (4.3
per cent).  Seasonality was more marked before the famine: the coefficient of variation
over the twelve months, monthly totals weighted for month length, was 0.38 in 1830-45
and 0.27 in 1846-70.  Seasonality was more marked among farmers and their kin, though
labourers’ accounts were subject to marked seasonality in this respect too.  Spinsters were
inclined to open accounts in the early part of the year.  Closings were also subject to
seasonality (Figure 1(b) ), though less so than openings, and here exogenous events were
more a disturbing force.  The peaks in closings in March-April (when over 22.3 per cent
accounts closed) are partly due to the timing of the panics of 1848 and 1856.  Closing
troughed in August (6.0 per cent of the total).  Since the number of transactions per
account was small a significant share of the withdrawing and depositing of money was
done through opening and closing accounts.  For this reason the broad similarity in the
seasonality patterns of openings and closings is rather interesting in itself.
The spread of opening lodgements by amount deposited is worth remarking on
(Figure 2).  A striking feature is that more than one-third of the sums (1,630 out of 4,213)-17-
were for exactly the maximum permitted sum of £30.  Note too the spikes at £5, £10, and
£20.  A relatively small number (fifty out of 4,213) of opening lodgements were above the
maximum permitted by legislation.  The biggest of these was the £99 deposited by  one
Mathew Hughes, address unknown, in March 1862; his sister Ann was allowed to place an
opening deposit of £60 in the same month.  William and Bridget Grady of Graigue,
Moycarkey deposited £60 each in March 1850; their father Thomas, a farmer, had held an
account since 1831, and it contained £200 in late 1848.  Those opening their accounts
with a deposit of less than £2 included three labourers, thirty-eight servants, seven bakers,
and two farmers.  Those opening with an even £30 included seven labourers, eight
servants, one baker, 311 farmers, and 296 other members identified as belonging to
farming households.-18--19-
The abuse of trust accounts, a common feature in Ireland, was also a feature in
Thurles.  A common practice was for a household head to open several trust accounts in
the names of other family members in order to overcome the regulation that no single
account be augmented by more that £30 in a single year.  Some or all of the accounts
might then be closed simultaneously at some later stage.  It is also significant that the
opening deposits in trust accounts tended to be bigger than average.  Only 8.5 per cent of
them were of £5 or under, compared to 18.5 per cent of all opening deposits.  Moreover,
nearly three-fifths (57.2 per cent) of the opening deposits of exactly £30 were trust
accounts, and a much higher proportion of trust accounts (52.6 per cent) were at the
upper limit of £30.  The occupational backgrounds of about one-third of those acting as
trustees are given, and about half of them were farmers or farmers’ wives.  Slightly over
half (52.1 per cent) of all trust accounts were held in the names of males.  Farmers,
gentlemen, married women, and widows, were less likely to open trust accounts for
females than males , while priests and policemen  were more likely to sponsor females
than males.  
 Trust accounts accounted for over one third of all accounts.  The average opening
balance of a trustee account was considerably larger than that of other accounts (£23
against £16.5).  In the ledgers a clear majority of trustees are noted as related to the
accounts they supported; and the great majority of these were parents.  As might be
expected, certain occupations featured disproportionately among the trustees.  Thus
priestly trustees outnumbered priestly depositors by over two to one.  While some acted
for relations, most did so for female parishioners.  Gentlemen, corndealers, medical
practitioners, and apothocaries were also strongly represented.  Most of these operated
trust accounts for family members and kinfolk.  The number of farmer trustees also
outnumbered the number of farmer accounts (by 640 to 574).  However, there were only
eight servant trustees against 215 servant accounts, six labourer trustees against 83
labourer accounts, and seventeen police trustees against 86 police accounts. 
The bank also held the accounts of about fifty charitable associations and societies,
mainly religious.  Half of these were associated with the Catholic Church, ranging from a
fund in support of Thurles cathedral to a society to help retired priests.  Both the
Presentation and Ursuline convents held accounts.  Also included was St. Paul’s loan fund
society, a microcredit institution run by the local Catholic clergy,  which began a very-20-
active account in 1839.  Its opening balance was only £1, but it made a further 245
deposits totalling £424 and 53 withdrawals before closing in 1860.  Also active were the
Thurles Altar Sodality (185 deposits totalling £271 between 1846 and 1871), the Catholic
Clerical Fund (88 deposits totalling £1,033 between 1831 and 1863), and the Teetotal
Temperance Society of Thurles (137 deposits totalling £362 between 1840 and 1850). 
The numerous Catholic societies reflect the vibrancy of devotional Catholicism in
prefamine Thurles.  More shortlived was the Mardyke Savings Society in Loughmore
parish, which accumulated £173 between 1841 and 1844.  A protestant missionary
collection organised by 17-year old Margaret Lester of Turtulla, Moycarkey raised £5 in
1837-8.  Several schools and dispensaries also held accounts, as did the Steam Engine and
Fireman Society (one deposit of £30 in June 1850, account closed in November 1851) and
the Dovea Clothing Club.  The last-mentioned, which made 17 deposits totalling £168
betwen 1852 and 1855, was sponsored by magistrate and landowner John Trant.
Information was not collected on the occupational status of all account-holders. 
The records make it clear, however, that the two main unskilled categories, labourers and
servants, were underrepresented.   In effect the TSB was a farmers’ bank.  Account-
holders described as farmers and members of farming families accounted for over one
account-holder in four, and it is clear from the ledgers that a significant number of those
described merely as ‘minors’, ‘spinsters’, ‘widows’, and ‘married women’ were also from
farming families.  These categories were to the fore throughout the bank’s history.  
Henry Cotton’s original call for support in 1829 referred to ‘the Benefit of the
Town and Neighbourhood’ but did not single out the industrious poor as beneficiaries. 
Whether the founders ever intended to target the working classes must remain a moot
point.  In evidence to the Poor Inquiry
31 a few years local clergyman Henry Armstrong, a
founding trustee of the TSB, pronounced it ‘prosperous’, but added that ‘very few of the
lower orders take advantage of it’.  This impression is confirmed by a close scrutiny of the
records.  Table 4, which summarises the profile of savers, contains some expected and
some perhaps surprising features.  The low average opening balances of servants and
labourers are to be expected, those of tailors and bakers perhaps less so.  They betoken
the lowly economic status of those occupations in the area.  At the other end of the
spectrum are landlowners and gentlemen, the groups with the highest average maximum
balance.  The closeness of opening, closing, and maximum balances for farmers, farmers’-21-
wives, and farmers’ children are interesting.  They suggest that farmers used the accounts
of family members to extract maximum benefit from the bank.
In general the picture is of rather inactive accounts, with an average of one or two
transactions a year.   The number of lodgements typically exceeded withdrawals.  This
seems to have been typical of nineteenth-century savings banks.
32  The average closing
balance exceeded the average opening balance in all occupational categories.  This
suggests that the bank was used as a vehicle for accumulation.  The average account was
held for about four years, with little variation here across occupations or parishes. 
However, it was quite common for account-holders to close their accounts and re-open
another later.  For example, Michael McGrath, a farmer from the parish of Drom, closed
one account in late 1839 and opened another five years later; Vernon Lanphier, a
Moycarkey landowner, held four different accounts between 1840 and 1869; and so on. 
In the decades of the TSB, most account-holders would have made their way to
the bank by foot or by horse and car: public transport would have been of little use.  This
kept the catchment area of the bank relatively small.  42 per cent (1769) of all account
holders lived in the parish of Thurles.  Another 38 per cent (1610) lived in the ring of five
parishes surrounding the town (Loughmore, Drom, Moycarkey, Templetouhy, and 
Holycross).  A further 13 per cent lived in an outer ring of seven parishes within eight to
ten miles of the town.  The remaining 6 per cent either lived further away or gave no
identifiable addresses.  Focusing on accounts opened before the end of 1845 only, the
percentages were not very different:  38 per cent in Thurles, 44 per cent in the inner ring,
13 per cent in the outer ring, and 6 per cent elsewhere or unidentified.  However, the
comparison suggests that Thurles town provided a greater share of accounts after the
famine than before it.  Distance also influenced the average number of deposits and
withdrawals.  The averages in Thurles itself  were double those in the outer ring of
parishes.  The average annual number of transactions was subject to a shoe-leather effect:
account holders in the town of Thurles itself were much more likely to visit the bank than
those living in its hinterland.  In the prefamine period the actuary took down a high
proportion of account holders’ ages, though hardly any after 1845.  The very high
proportion of accounts in the names of children and juveniles again suggests that their
names were used to circumvent the rules.-22-
4. FAMINE, PANIC, AND CONTAGION:
Though the Great Famine undoubtedly influenced Irish savings banks, the link
between the famine and the banks’ fortunes in the late 1840s is not straightforward.  
Indeed in the early stages some press commentary suggested that the banks’ seeming
prosperity belied claims of hardship and crisis.  Editorials highlighted reports from Ireland
of increases in deposits as evidence of ‘successful swindling’ or welfare fraud on the part of
the people.
33  However, both aggregate data and individual case studies seem to suggest
that the economic shock caused by the famine dealt a serious blow to Ireland’s savings
banks.  Between 1845 and 1849 aggregate deposits fell from nearly £2.9 million to £1.2
million, and the number of depositors dropped by more than half.  Of the forty-four
savings banks in the United Kingdom that ceased business between 1844 and 1852,
twenty-four were Irish.
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The famine placed all Irish financial institutions under pressure, and the savings
banks were not immune.  However, the trends in deposits and the number of accounts in
the late 1840s are more complex than the numbers above imply.  When decline set in the
spatial pattern was not what predicted by our knowledge of the spatial incidence of the
famine.  Population loss between 1841 and 1851 is a good measure of the damage done
by the famine.  By this reckoning the famine was most severe in Connacht, which lost 29
per cent of its people in the decade.  Munster with 22 per cent came next, a good ahead of
both Ulster (16 per cent) and Leinster (15 per cent).  The pattern for savings banks during
the famine were quite different.  Between November 1845 and November 1846 aggregate
deposits fell slightly, but there were rises in all provinces except Leinster (where they fell
by 18 per cent).  Leinster’s problems were due mainly to the collapse of its second biggest
bank (on which more below).  In 1845/6 deposits rose most in Connacht.  In 1846-7 the
decline in deposits was greatest in Ulster (19 per cent), while in 1847-8 it was greatest in
Leinster (53 per cent) and least in Connacht (34 per cent).
The main reason for the drop in deposits and accounts in the late 1840s was not
the famine, but the much-publicized, sensational failures of three Irish savings banks in
1848, and the ensuing financial contagion.  The collapse of St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank
located on Dublin’s Cuffe Street was notable for being ‘the first real sign of a chink in the
armour designed by Parliament’.  That bank had been the target of embezzlement and
mismanagement since the 1820s, and probably should have been closed in 1831.
35  -23-
Mismanagement continued to be a problem.  A run on the bank in November 1845
marked the beginning of the end.  When it closed its doors on 10 May 1848 its liabilities
had reached nearly £65,000 against assets of £100 or so.  Sensing that the game was up
and that compensation was unlikely some depositors of the Cuffe Street bank began to
sell their pass books at a discount in the following week.
36  More sensational were the
collapses in rapid succession of two Kerry savings banks in April 1848.  First to go was
the Tralee bank, in the wake of a confession by its actuary to having embezzled it over an
extended period.
37  The actuary, who had  operated the business from his own house,
‘which afforded him considerable latitude for carrying on his frauds’, had built up
liabilities of £36,768 against £1,650 assets for which he got 14 years’ transportation.
38  The
Killarney Savings Bank, which held over one thousand accounts, closed its doors on 18
April 1848.  In this case the actuary, one D.W. Murphy, fled, leaving liabilities of £36,000
against assets of £16,582.
John Tidd Pratt, who investigated the two Kerry banks in May 1848, produced a
report which was highly critical of both management and depositors.
39  In no savings bank
in the United Kingdom had he ever found ‘so great a number of what I consider large
accounts.’  He added that his duty was ‘far from being a pleasant one’.
40  As numerous
Tralee account-holders handed in their pass books to the clerk, it emerged that ‘some of
the farming class, apparently poor, had sums to a surprising amount lodged  –  even over
a thousand pounds each’.
41  Similarly in the wake of the collapse of the Killarney savings
bank,  ‘tenants, who pleaded extreme poverty to their landlords, paupers from the
workhouse, and men whose outward appearance would lead you to look on them as
objects of charity, were soon at the office door’.
42  In colorful evidence to a parliamentary
inquiry a year later Tidd Pratt spoke of ‘cases where husbands brought books representing
the money to be the property of their sisters, and upon calling the sisters it turned out to
be their wives’, and of ‘persons producing books before me stating it was not their own
property, but was the property of their nephews and nieces; and upon my informing them
that their nephews and nieces must come themselves, when the children came it was quite
clear that they had never seen the book’.  Another man ‘had a large sum of money in the
bank, and it had been stated that if he was pressed [for rent] they must sell his bed under
him, and several cases of that kind’.
43  Tidd Pratt’s irritation at what he deemed ‘the utter
disregard of truth, the falsehood and subornation of perjury displayed by the claimants’-24-
was understandable.  Yet he was was too ready to accept the assertions of some of his
friendlier informants as fact.  His report to the Lords of the Treasury Tidd Pratt, no doubt
accurately, described the claimants as belonging ‘to a class of persons for whom these
institutions were never intended’.  But he lacked evidence for his assertions that many had
invested in the savings banks in order to avoid paying rent, and that others were in receipt
of indoor or outdoor poor relief.
44  
Tidd Pratt’s damaging accusations were widely circulated in the domestic and
foreign press.
45  Henry Arthur Herbert, M.P. for Kerry, who declared that he had seen
them in the Augsburg Gazette, vigorously rebutted them.  Against the claim that three men
in jail for debt ‘had presented themselves in custody of their gaolers to claim as
depositors’ Herbert produced a letter from the prison governor that ‘no such
circumstance ever occurred’.  Tidd Pratt was forced to withdraw his accusation before the
committee.
46  Another  widely-circulated claim that inmates had left the workhouse in
search of their deposits was also probably a fiction.  In Killarney workhouse Herbert was
given the names of four inmates who, according to the master, applied for dismissal at the
time of Tidd Pratt’s hearings, and ‘whom some of the inmates of the workhouse had
accused, in a joking way, of having money in the bank’.  Herbert engaged a friend to
search the list of applicants appearing before Tidd Pratt for the four names, but none
could be found.
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The impact of the sensational failures in Dublin and Kerry was far-reaching.  In
Belfast there was a serious run on the savings bank ‘by nervous and doubtful depositors’. 
At the other end of Ireland panicky account-holders forced the Cork Savings Bank to pay
out £45,000 in two weeks.
48 In Thurles the disaster resulted in more accounts being closed
in 1848 than in any other year in the TSB’s history.  Between April to September 322
accounts were closed.  Depositors were slow to return to the savings banks, and recovery
was impeded by a more aggressive search for accounts on the part of the joint-stock banks
after mid-century.  The National Bank began to accept deposits of ten shillings or more at
the current rate of interest.  The fragility of the savings banks after 1848 is well reflected
in the run that spread from Cork to Dublin in 1853, stemming from a rumour that the
Cork Savings Bank had closed for good, when in fact it was merely refurbishing its
facilities.
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Were those who panicked in 1848 systematically different from those who held-25-
their nerve?  We have already addressed this question in the very different context of the
Emigrant Savings Bank.
50  In the less formal analysis that follows we compare the
panickers (approximated by those who closed accounts between April and September
1848) with four other sets of account-holders: first, the 341 account-holders who closed
their accounts in 1843-5; second, the 384 who closed in between January 1847 and March
1848; third, the 310 who closed in 1849-51; and finally, the 482 who held accounts in
March 1848 but chose not to close them in the following months.  The results are given in
Table 6.
Note first the apparent absence of any strong gender affect: women, it seems, were
slightly less inclined to panic, but the difference in the proportion of female closers in the
five groups is small.  Nor did the opening and closing balances of those who panicked
differ much from the balances of those who did not.  Account-holders with addresses in
Thurles were slightly more inclined to panic but again the effect is small.  There is little
evidence either of panickers clustering by parish.  Two differences are more significant. 
During the panic account-holders with the same surname and address were more likely to
close.  Farmers and members of farming households were also more likely to close, while
people of means, such as landowners, clergy, and professionals, were less likely to do so. 
It is hardly surprising that when parents closed accounts, they also closed those of their
children.  That networks of occupation, sex, or parish did not register may reflect secrecy
about accounts.  That servants and labourers were also marginally more likely to keep
their accounts open is perhaps more surprising.  
The failure of the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank in early 1856 caused another peak in
TSB account closures.  The Tipperary Bank, which had a branch in Thurles since 1840,
was the creature of John Sadleir M.P.  Sadleir lived mostly in London but exercised full
control of the bank’s funds through his brother James.  Since the early 1850s John Sadleir,
a controversial figure in Irish politics, had been using the bank to finance his disastrous
and fraudulent speculations.  These included selling shares in bogus companies and
fictitious deeds to landed property.  The Tipperary Bank suspended payments on 19
February in the wake of Sadleir’s suicide on Hampstead Heath in London.  Most Irish
banks came under pressure in the following days and weeks.
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In Thurles, where the business of the Tipperary Bank had been ‘rather extensive’,
neither the National nor the TSB was immune.  In the immediate aftermath of the-26-
collapse a police presence was required to protect the Tipperary Bank’s premises against
angry farmers.  
A local newspaper claimed that the panic did not extend beyond ‘the small farmer
class’.
52  How does this square with the TSB’s records?  In Table 7 we compare the
seventy-five accounts closed during February and March 1856 with the 199 closed in
1853-55 and the 191 closed in 1857-58.  The profiles are quite similar in most respects. 
However, both average opening and closing balances were higher during the panic than
before it; farmers, members of farming families, and labourers were much more
prominent among closers in 1856 than either before or after; and those who withdrew
during the panic were much more likely to be people with the same surname as other
closers.  Policemen, landowners, professional people, and the gentry were less inclined to
panic.  This suggests that family networks were an important influence on the decision to
close an account.
The collapse was unfortunate for the TSB in another respect.  For many years the
TSB had held a balance of several hundred pounds with the National Bank.  When the
National Bank announced a reduction in the rate of interest on this sum from 2.5 to two
per cent in mid-1855, the account was moved to Sadleir’s bank.
53  The decision, which
cost the TSB nearly five hundred pounds, would haunt it till the end.  As resultant
economy measures, the trustees were forced in November 1858 to reduce the actuary’s
salary by £10 and in May 1859 to reduce the interest payable on deposits to 2.5 per cent.
54
Had the TSB’s loss been more widely known at the time, the run on it would surely have
been more sustained.    
V.  CONCLUSION:
It is often suggested that the poor and the working classes don’t save  –  or at least
don’t save much.  Controversies about the trade-off between economic ‘justice’ and
economic growth turn, in part at least, on this assumption. In industrialising Britain,
however, there was no lack of schemes encouraging the poor to save.  This paper has
been about the impact of one of those schemes in a setting rather different from that
envisaged by its Scottish founders.  Two features of the Irish variant have been
highlighted.  First, using both aggregate dat and the records of an individual savings bank,
it addressed the question whether the banks met their founders’ aim of making the poor-27-
more provident.  We found that, to an even greater extent than in England and even more
so than in Scotland, Irish savings banks benefitted disproportionately the comfortably off. 
The main reason for this is that in Ireland before mid-century the rate of interest payable
was generous compared to on offer from the joint-stock banks.  While some poor people
undoubtedly benefitted, it is clear that the lion’s share of the benefits went to a minority
of relatively affluent account-holders.  The fate of the elderly poor, in particular, would
remain an abiding policy concern.  The solution ultimately adopted, the old age pension,
was strenuously opposed by the savings banks on the grounds that it would crowd out
private saving.
Second, Ireland’s relative backwardness made its savings banks vulnerable to
another form of abuse.  The embezzlement and collapse of three banks in a single year
(1848) was bad enough in itself, but more serious for the survival of the system as a whole
was that the financial contagion that resulted.  Deposits in Irish savings banks would
never recover their pre-panic level.  The same cannot be said for England in the wake of
the equally sensational collapse less than two years later of Rochdale Savings Bank. 
Rochdale’s actuary had defrauded depositors of over £70,000.  Nonetheless these and
other lesser swindles exposed a serious weakness in the system more generally.  They
prompted a debate about alternatives to savings banks and facilitated the adoption of
William Gladstone’s post office savings system in 1861.
55-28-
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TABLE 4: THE FIRST ACCOUNT HOLDERS
Date Name Details Amount (£)
14 dec 1829 (*) Thomas Kirwan aged 30, TSB treasurer    1
14 dec  (*) William Ryan in trust for Mary Ann Ryan    1
14 dec  (*) James Butler medical practitioner    1
14 dec  (*) Thomas Kirwan in trust for Philip Kirwan    1
21 dec  (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Master Richard Hoops, age 9 1 10s 0d
21 dec  (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Master Alex Hoops, age 7 1 10s 0d
21 dec Bridget Shea Thurles   30
21 dec Bridget Shea for Eleanor Shea,  age 2   30
21 dec Bridget Shea for Thomas Shea, age 6 months   30
21 dec   Bridget Shea for husband   30
28 dec Michael Mullally Thurles     7
4 jan 1830 Bridget Shea for niece (M. Lyons), age 9   30
4 jan  (*) William Ryan for Thomas Ryan, age 2     1
11 jan (*) William Ryan for Daniel Fogarty, age 40 4 10s 0d
11 jan (*) Rev William Byrne for Michael Brennan, age about 40   30
11 jan (*) William Ryan for William Ryan, age 1     1
11 jan (*) Adam Cooke for Charles, age 19 2 5s 0d
18 jan (*) Adam Cooke for John Bryan, Thurles, age 30 4 10s 0d
18 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Miss Jane Lee   10
18 jan (*) Charles O’Keeffe for Fanny, age 20   10
18 jan (*) Charles O’Keeffe for Mary, age 18   10
18 jan James Mara age 30   30
18 jan William Mara Maxfort, Moycarkey, age 35   30
18 jan (*) Thomas Molony Maxfort, Moycarkey, age 40    1
18 jan Richard Walsh Brownstown, age 30   20
18 jan (*) Thomas Maher Commons, age 50   30
18 jan (*) Hugh Mulcahy Esq. for Judith Neill   30
18 jan (*) Hugh Mulcahy Esq.   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Benjamin, age 10   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke  for Mary, age 8   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke  for William, age 5   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Sarah, age 4   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Archibald, age 6   30
18 jan Eugene Sullivan chandler, 35 1  1s 0d
18 jan Edward Flaherty tobacconist    1
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Miss Nicholson sr    2
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong  for Alex Hoops 0  2s 0d
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Richard Hoops 0  2s 0d
25 jan James Callahan age 40    5
25 jan Thomas Ryan Inch, age 16    1
25 jan Judith Fogarty married woman 0  1s 0d
25 jan Jerh Fogerty age 40   30
1 feb Judith McGuire widow, 60   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for Catherine McGuire, age 18   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for daughterr Elizabeth, age 23   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for son William, age 21   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan age 35   30-29-
1 feb Thomas Flanagan for mother   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan for wife   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan for daughter, age 6 months   30
1 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Mary Grace, servant 20  1s 0d
1 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Michael Hayes, shopman, age 18   12
8 feb Edmund Ryan dealer, age 50   10
8 feb Michael Delany steward, age 30   16
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Johanna Quigly, age 20   16
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Edmund Fitzgibbon 7  6s 6d
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Ellen Fitzgerald 8 14 1d
8 feb Philip Heaney Ballinahow, Holycross, age 30   18
(*) Trustee and/or management committee
___________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 6: ACCOUNTS CLOSED 1853-8
1853-1855 Feb-Mar 1856   1857-58
Number 199     75 191
Female  (%) 45.7 46.7 37.7
Avg. Opening Balance (£) 17.5 20.7 19.0
Avg. Closing Balance (£)  23.3 29.8 28.1
Avg. Date open Oct 50 Dec 49             Nov 54
Thurles address (%) 34.4 36.7 37.7
In trust  (%) 32.7 38.7 44.0
Withdrew at same as another 
    with same surname/address (%) 23.6 50.7 40.3
Status or occupation where given (%)
Farming (incl family)  30.1  47.9 28.2
Labourers, servants, dealers, etc.  11.5  18.3 10.7
Married women, widows, spinsters  26.9  20.0 27.5
Minors    5.4    4.2 13.0
Gents, corndealers, doctors    5.4    1.4   6.9
RIC    5.4    1.4   2.3
Other  14.6    6.8 10.7
100.0 100.0 100.0




TABLE 7: CLOSURES BEFORE AND DURING THE PANIC OF 1848
Closed Closed            Closed Closed Open in March ‘48
1844-5     Jan ‘47-Mar ‘48       Apr-Sept ‘48          1849-51  but did not close
Number 341  384  322 310 482
Female  (%) 41.1 38.8 41.0 45.5 41.9
Avg. Opening Balance (£) 18.7 20.0 21.3 18.0 19.4
Avg. Closing Balance (£)  23.6 26.5 29.7 18.4 32.4
Avg. Date open Sept 40 Aug 43 Dec 43 Dec 44 Sept 41
Address in Thurles (%) 41.9 43.0 35.4 47.7 39.4
      Moycarkey (%)   7.0  8.6   9.3   8.0
      Holycross (%)   6.5 10.2 12.8   6.5
      Drom (%)   6.7  9.1   7.8   7.1
In trust  (%) 41.1 47.4 47.8 47.7 37.3
Withdrew in same month as another 
   with same surname/address (%) 22.9 38.3 43.5 21.6   --
Status or occupation (%)
   Farming (incl family) 40.4  44.6  47.5 35.3  32.2
   Labourers, servants, dealers, etc. 16.4  12.9  13.2 11.3  10.7
   Married women, widows, spinsters 20.8  20.9  19.0 24.0  16.2
   Minors  4.8    9.4    7.0  6.3    8.1
   Gents, corndealers, doctors  8.0    1.7    2.5  8.0    3.7
   RIC  1.6    2.1    0.4  2.5    2.7
   Other given  8.0    8.3   10.3 12.6    8.9
   Total given 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Not given  91     97     80 72    83
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TABLE 5: PROFILES OF THURLES ACCOUNT HOLDERS 1829-1870
STATUS    NO.   AVG. OPENING     AVG. CLOSING   AVG. MAX         TOTAL AVG. NO. AVG. NO.     AVG. AVG.
      BALANCE (£)        BALANCE (£)  BALANCE (£)          DEPOSITS (£) LDGMTS WTHDRLS  DURATION TRANS.
Baker     25   7   13      17 24  12.4    2.3 1.8 8.2
Servant   215   8   13      18 24    4.9    2.2  5.2 1.4
Labourer     83 13   13      19 29    3.9    3.4  3.4 2.1
Tailor     15   8   14      18 26    4.8    3.8 2.8 3.1
Dealer     30 13   17      27 46    7.4    5.3 4.1 3.1
Esquire     57 24   32      47 75    4.3    2.3 4.1 1.6
Landowner     26 21   46      54 64    3.8    2.4  3.9 1.6
Farmer   574 24   31      41 55    3.0    2.4  4.4 1.3
Farmer’s dr.   136 23   32      40 47    2.3    1.2 4.2 0.8
Farmer’s son   205 25   35      43 54    2.4    1.2 5.2 0.7
Farmer’s wife   169 23   35      44 50    2.6    1.6 4.6 0.9
Minor   262 18   29      38 48    5.9    1.7 5.5 1.4
Policeman     86 16   27      32 34    4.0    1.9 4.2 1.4
Married woman    323 18   25      33 45    5.4    2.2  3.6 2.1
Spinster   349 19   29      36 47    5.6    1.7 4.3 1.7
Widow   112 20   23      34 42    3.4    3.4 4.6 1.5
Catholic curate       36 22   25      34 42    2.5    1.8 3.5 1.2
Male 2387 20   26      34 44    3.8    2.0 4.0 1.5
Female 1826 17   25      32 40    4.5    1.9 4.2 1.5
Total 4213 19   26      33 43    4.2    2.0 4.1 1.5
Thurles 1768 16   21      29 40    5.8    2.3 3.8 2.1
Other 2445 21   29      37 44    2.9    1.7 4.3 1.1
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